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Quality of governance and bank valuation in Russia: an empirical 
study 
 
Vassily Bokov1, Andrei Vernikov2 
 
This paper aims at explaining the differences in valuation ofbanking firms in Russia from the 
quality of governance point of view. A sample of acquisition deals and public offerings over the last 
5 years is taken with view of discovering factors that investors deem to be significant in making a 
decision whether to invest in a given banking firm and, if so, at what price. We use price-to-book-
value of equity (P/BV) multiple as astandard measurement of valuation and the dependent variable. 
As toexplanatory variables, we put together a set of proxies for quality of bank governance and 
management, such as: the degree of control concentration, managerial experience,the degree of 
compliance with corporate governance best practices (e.g. the degree of Board independence, the 
level of qualification of external auditors), the stability of bank’s governing bodies (theManagement 
Board and the Board of Directors), and the availability of external credit ratings. We find out which 
factors are statistically significant and relevant. A least squares multiple linear regression model is 
devised to check how individual variables explain the differences in valuation. We discover that 
external investors attach value to high concentration of ownership, sheer size of the bank, stability 
of the governing bodies involvement of well-established external auditors and also that strategic 
investors tend to pay higher acquisition premiums. The features of the Board of Directors such as 




Shareholder value is at the heart of corporate finance theory. We aim to explain the 
differences in valuation of banking firms in Russia from the quality of governance point of view. It 
is ‘common knowledge’ that financial markets and individual investors reward better-governed 
companies and banks by higher share price. Conversely, shortcomings in the area of governance 
must lead to a destruction of shareholder value. While this assumption does not cause logical 
difficulties, its accurate testing with empirical data is a challenge in emerging markets like Russia. 
There is no single widely-accepted methodology to measure the quality of governance. Data on 
company valuation are not readily available for econometric analysis because very few banking 
institutions have equity securities in free float in the stock market. In this paper the authors are 
trying to do their best to start filling in these gaps. 
Thepaper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a concise review of publications 
devoted to the connection between the quality of governance on a firm level and the valuation of the 
firm. Section 3 lists the main theoretical hypotheses that we would like to test on the Russian bank 
data. Section 4 indicates the sources of data that we use. Section 5 offers a detailed discussion of our 
explanatory variables. Section 6 contains the description of the model and the results of estimation. 
In Section 7 we offer an interpretation of the received results. Section 8 concludes with the main 
findings and directions for future research. 
 
1. Review of literature 
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One can find two main clusters of research related to our subject: one on assessment and 
quantification of governance quality in Russian banks, and the other on the interplay between 
governance and firm valuation. 
Standard & Poor’s, the rating agency, has developed a methodology for appraisal and scoring 
of corporate governance resulting in corporate governance rating in two different scales – national 
and international [Standard & Poor’s, 2006]. The methodology includes the basic principles and 
criteria, and differentiates between country background and individual company analysis. The main 
4 components of company analysis are: ownership structure and external influence; shareholders’ 
rights and the relations with affiliated persons; transparency, information disclosure and audit; and 
Board of Directors structure and effectiveness. The coverage of companies by corporate governance 
rating has remained extremely limited, and to date only one Russian bank has been awarded such a 
rating.  
In 2008 Standard & Poor’s published its substantially modified methodology of corporate 
governance ratingsunder the name of GAMMA — Governance, Accountability, Management 
Metrics and Analysis [Standard & Poor’s, 2008]. The approach shifts its focus away from an 
abstract appraisal of governance in the given bank against the background of ‘best practice’ towards 
an analysis of specific risks taken by investor. GAMMA’s main components are: influence by 
shareholders; shareholders’ rights; transparency, audit and risk management system; and Board of 
Directors effectiveness, the process of strategizing, and compensation system. 
Since2004 the Russian Institute of Directors (RID) jointly with Expert-RA rating agency 
[RID & Expert-RA] have been awarding ‘national corporate governance ratings’ based on 
proprietary methodology.  
Standard & Poor’s also publish regular surveys of transparency and disclosure of Russian 
banks. The latest survey [Standard & Poor's, 2007] covers the top 30 banks and aims to appraise the 
degree of disclosure of information relevant for investment community, against ‘international best 
practice’. Thefocusisoncomprehensivenessandintegrityofpubliclyavailableinformationon the main 
operational parameters, financial soundness, ownership structure and corporate governance 
mechanisms. Although Standard & Poor’s explicitly warn that their transparency and disclosure 
score should not be used to gauge corporate governance quality, the two concepts have much in 
common and display a high degree of synchronization. 
In 2007 the International Finance Corporation published itsnew survey of corporate 
governance in Russia’s banking sector [IFC, 2007], covering 82 private institutions. IFC examines 
commitment to good corporate governance; practices of the Supervisory and Management Board; 
transparency and disclosure; internal control and risk management; and shareholder rights. The 
survey stops short of awarding individual ratings to banks and comparing them against a common 
scale. This survey insightfully examines the practices of both the Supervisory and Management 
Boards and their interplay, while most other publications tend to limit their scope to the structure 
and practices of the Supervisory Board only.  
The link between the quality of governance and the valuation of companies is sufficiently 
researched with regard to mature markets but much less so for emerging markets. Morcket al. 
[2005] reviews the large literature that explores the connection between country-level rules 
affecting corporate governance and firm behavior and the strengths of securities markets. Klapper 
and Love [2004] analyze connection between the measure of firm-level governance and share price 
on a cross-country basis. On the level of oneemerging market country (Korea) Choiand 
Hasan[2005] examine the effect of ownership and governance on firm performance and discover 
evidence that: the extent of the foreign ownership level has a significant positive association with 
the bank return and a significant negative association with the bank risk; the number of outside 
board of directors does not have any significant affect on performance; the presence of a foreign 
director on that board is significantly associated with bank return and risk. 
Bernard S. Black has made a seminal contribution to the study of the impact of governance on 
firm valuation in Russia and other emerging markets [Black, 2001; Black et al., 2006]. In order to 
obtain a combined index of governance in Russian firms, 6 indices produced by 6 different agencies 
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for irregular periods are standardized and put together.Black et al. [2006] finds an economically 
important and statistically strong correlation between governance and market value. However, it 
matters a great deal how one measures governance. 
Staryuk usesthe value-based management concept to research how corporate governance has 
driven the stock market valuation of theRussian ‘blue chip’ companies [Staryuk, 2008]; banks are 
not covered. 
In August 2008, Bokov and Vernikov made an attempt to explainthe differences in the 
valuation of Russian banks from a quality of governance point of view [Bokov, Vernikov, 2008]. 
They discovered that strategic investors appreciate high concentration of ownership and stability of 
the management team, while broadly neglecting the features of the Board of Directors as well as 
bank transparency. This article is a revised version of the above-referred conference paper.  
 
2. Theoretical hypotheses 
 
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. In a 
narrow definition governance is a mechanism for defending shareholders’ interests and property. A 
positive connection is assumed to exist between broad measures of firm-level corporate governance 
quality and higher share prices [Black et al.,2006].Then specific factors usually associated with 
‘international best practices’ of corporate governance must also display a positive connection with 
the firm’s value. Among such factors we list disclosure of information and transparency of the 
bank; coverage by major and internationally recognized external auditors and credit rating agencies; 
existence of a strong, competent and independent Board of Directors; presence of a coherent and 
competent banking team; fair representation of all shareholders, including minority ones, and 
reliable systems to protect their interests; and built-in constraints to opportunistic action by bank 
insiders and affiliated persons. Financial markets are presumed to reward by a higher valuation of 
equity what they perceive as good governance. Conversely, the perceived insufficient quality of 
governance leads to loss of shareholder value in companies from emerging market countries 
including Russia. 




We collected a sample of acquisition (takeover) transactions and public offerings of common 
stock by Russian banks over 2006-2008 to analyze differences in valuation (see Appendix). We 
chose to use only the acquisition deals and stock offerings primarily because they provide a 
measure of the firm’s value that is straightforward to interpret. Data on deals come from a variety of 
sources, including major industry databases, such as [Hoover’s] and [Bankers’ Almanac], and 
media surveys. Initially, the sample consisted of 25 transactions, including several transactions by 
the same entity (e.g. the consecutive public offerings by Vozrozhdenie Bank, and a series of 
transactions with the shares of Rosbank). The sample includes major transactions, i.e. involving 
entities with over USD100 million, or equivalent in assets. This filter was introduced to avoid 
looking at the acquisition of licenses, rather than of working businesses. We only managed to 
collect part of the data necessary for the analysis, and had to exclude more than half of the initial 
sample for various reasons. Some of the banks did not make adequate disclosure of information. 
Other banks have reorganized so deeply that any data about the initial entity has been completely 
pulled from information systems (e.g. Investsberbank has removed all pre-acquisition data from 
public databases). The so-called ‘people’s IPOs’3 of Sberbank and VTB were dropped because, in 
our opinion, those deals were largely off-market, given the degree of state support received and the 
emphasis on non-qualified investors. We have also avoided deals between foreign banks (i.e. 
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transfers of Russian assets from one foreign owner to another), primarily in view of their off-market 
pricing, which is usually the case, e.g., with Asian banks. 
The final sample includes 10 deals starting with 2006 sale of Impexbank to Raiffeisen, and 
concluding with the 2008 sale of Uniastrum Bank to the Bank of Cyprus in mid-2008. Our data can 
broadly be classified into two broad categories of transactions: (a) the direct sale of business, or a 
controlling stake in its equity, a notable example being the sale of Absolut Bank to KBC of Belgium 
in September 2007; and (b) public offerings, both IPOs and SPOs4, such as the IPO of Bank 
St.Petersburg in November 2007, or the SPO of Vozrozhdenie in May 2007. 
Financial indicators have been taken from [Bankscope] database, and also from [Bankers’ 
Almanac]. Finally, the data on shareholding, personal details of top managers and Directors, and the 
qualityof auditors come from the regulatory statements submitted on a quarterly basis by all issuers 




We chose price-to-book-value (P/BV) ratio of banks as the dependent variable in our model. 
This indicator has the advantage of being the most commonly used measurement of bank valuation, 
particularly in the absence of highly developed and sophisticated stock markets that involve a broad 
range of equities issued by banks. The choice of P/BV allows us to sterilize the effects of banks’ 
sheer size on valuation. At the same time some of the P/BV multiples result from single large 
transactions, rather than from an infinite number of small market-based interactions. Large single 
transactions, especially those involving shift of control over the bank, are by definition always 
unique, and may be concluded on terms well beyond market-proven price corridors at each point in 
time.  
As tothe explanatory (independent) variables, having just one explanatory variable, for 
differences in bank valuation, would have rendered simplicity to the econometric analysis.(?) At the 
outset we were tempted to employ one of the existing ratings of corporate governance,e.g. that 
assigned by Standard & Poor’s, but the use of already-available indices is deterred by their meager 
coverage of banks – e.g., just one Russian bank holds a corporate governance rating from Standard 
& Poor’s, and another one - a rating from RID & Expert-RA.  
We focus on the following range of candidate independent variables: 
1. Asset size (ASSETS) is used as a control variable to account for the possible premium for 
large acquisitions (market share premium). In other words, we expect the premium to 
increase with the growth of asset size. 
2. Quality of auditors (AUDITORS) is used as a proxy of bank transparency that is an essential 
component of governance quality. AUDITORS is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if 
the bank’s external auditor is a ‘Big-4’ accounting firm (Ernst & Young, Deloitte, KPMG, 
or PricewaterhouseCoopers), and a value of 0 otherwise. We think that, ceteris paribus, it is 
better-governed banks that undertake efforts to increase transparency, to disclose more 
information and subject themselves to the scrutiny of external auditors of proven integrity 
and rigor. The global capital markets generally require the issuer to provide investors with 
highly reliable financial information. The quality of audit and the integrity of the auditors 
significantly affect the quality of information available to financial markets, while lack of 
proper audit impairs a bank’s ability to raise funding from those markets. We expect that the 
more transparent the bank is, the smaller the acquirer’s discount for possible risk of 
accounting fraud.Overall AUDITORS is assumedto have a positive correlation with bank 
valuation.  
3. Rating agency coverage (RATINGS) – a variable counting the number of credit rating 
agencies that cover the bank. The range of this variable is from 0 when the bank is not rated 
by either of the major globally recognized ratings agencies - Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, 
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or Fitch Ratings, to 3 when rated by all 3 of these agencies. Rating agencies are expected to 
perform a thorough and impartial risk assessment on behalf of investors. Similarly to 
AUDITORS, the extent of ratings agencies’ coverage could significantly impact the ability 
of the firm to raise funds from public financial markets. Higher value of RATINGS 
indicator might reflect greater transparency and better governance. 
4. Size of the Board of Directors (BOD_SIZE) – the number of people sitting on the Board. 
We assume that going over some notional threshold of the Board size5 would jeopardize the 
Board’s inefficiency for two reasons: (a) an excessive numerical composition is usually an 
indicator of irrelevance of at least some of Board members; (b) a big size of the Board might 
inhibit productive discussion,lead to a bureaucratization of the Board functioning and thus 
adversely impact the ability of the firm to make swift and timely policy decisions. At the 
same time, too small a Board may not allow different views and interests to be represented. 
5. Degree of Board independence (BOD_IND) – the share of independentDirectors in the total 
number. The Board has to be reasonably independent from the bank management in order to 
perform its fiduciary duties, and independent directors are expected to be free from the 
conflict of interest, unlike the managers whose actions the Board must monitor. The Russian 
legislation expressly limits the maximum number of members of the Management Board to 
sit on the Board of Directors to 25% of all Directors, but the rest of them can be other 
insiders unless they declare their ‘independent’ status.  
6. Shareholder concentration (SCR) – the sum of shares of the top 3 shareholders in the charter 
capital of the bank.We expect this indicator to have a positive impact on price in case of 
acquisitions, while its impact in the case of public offerings is uncertain.An acquirer,who 
wishes to quickly gain control and not to have to deal with minority shareholders, must be 
inclined to pay a premium to book value of the bank. At first glance, SCR appears to express 
a premium paid for control over the bank. Actually SCR is less about the price at which 
control over the bank is sold, but more about the dispersion of the remaining stock after 
acquisition.At the same time, minority stake holders and potential investors in bank shares at 
an IPO or SPO can reasonably doubt their potential clout over decision-making in a bank 
where one or a few intimately affiliated individuals have been firmly entrenched (on 
entrenchment of blockholders against new shareholders see [LaPortaet al., 1999]). 
7. Stability of the Management Board (MB_STABILITY) – average tenure of Management 
Board (‘pravlenie’) members. Low turnover among top managers can mean that there are no 
major conflicts within the Management Board, the management team is coherent and 
balanced and one of high quality. The assumption stands that an acquirer depends on the 
cooperation and goodwill of the previous top management, be it only for statutory reasons 
and for the sake of business continuity. An acquirer should also want to keep in place a 
successful and competent management team that has performed so well in the past. In turn, a 
stable management team can be assumed more likely to stay with the bank after ownership 
change. If so, then high value of MB_STABILITY should lead to an extra premium that an 
acquirer is prepared to pay.  
8. Stability of the Board of Directors (BOD_STABILITY) is average tenure of Directors. This 
variable can impact valuation with either a positive or negative sign. On the one hand, low 
rates of turnover in the Board can be viewed as an indicator of maturity, stability, continuity 
and firm control by the key shareholders, thus attributing a positive sign to this indicator. On 
the other hand, a protracted period of Directors’ duties might be an unequivocal sign of 
entrenchment of the key shareholder(-s) against all other parties, including minorities. The 
Russian law does not support the institution of ‘staggered boards’ and the entire Board is re-
elected every year at the regular annual meeting of the shareholders. Voting usually follows 
the ‘cumulative’ model, meaning that a single drop-out between regular annual meetings 
                                                 
5 From practical experience and empirical evidence of corporate governance in Russia we take the number of 7 directors 
as a tentative threshold of optimal size of a Board. 
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triggers the full Board re-election at the extraordinary meeting. The absence of such 
corporate events might reflect various phenomena. Another consideration is that a bank with 
an overly ‘stable’ Board is prone to enjoy comfort, becoming lazy and averse to risk-taking, 
innovation and adjustment. There is also a risk that over time material interests of the Board 
Directors might become increasingly aligned with those of the bank management rather than 
its shareholders. The aforementioned phenomena would denote poor governance and 
explain a possible negative impact of BOD_STABILITY on bank valuation. 
9. Time period (TIME) – a variable, representing the quarter in which our observation is made 
(a transaction is completed). The variable takes on integer values between 1 and 22, with 1 
corresponding to Q1 2003, and 22 corresponding to Q2 2008. This variable was included to 
account for any possible overall increase or decrease in bank acquisition activity over time, 
thus confounding with the specific company characteristics affecting valuation. We decided 
to include TIME in our sample, along with variables featuring the quality of governance and 
management in a bank, in order to exercise control over the effect of natural market 
evolution. A rising confidence in the Russian banking sector leads to cheaper targets bought 
first. Variables 1 – 10 (and especially variables 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 8) might display co-linearity 
with TIMEbecause the natural evolution of governance quality is expected to be the one of 
gradual improvement over time. 
10. Strategic nature of the transaction (STRATEGIC) – a dummy variable taking on the value of 
1 if the acquisition can be considered strategic, and 0 otherwise. We consider to be strategic 
the investments with an intention to influence the direction of the bank’s development on 
behalf of the acquirer; and if the acquisition is deemed to be a long term investment, not an 
intended resale or speculation. 
Table 1 lists in the alphabetic order a tentative set of independent variables to be included in 
the model and anticipates the sign of these variables’ impact on the dependent variable (P/BV). 
 
Table 1: Preliminary set of explanatory variables  
Variable Stands for Expected impact 
ASSETS Natural logarithm of asset size Positive 
AUDITORS Quality of auditors (1 if auditors are a Big-4 firm. 0 – otherwise) 
Positive 
BOD_IND Percentage of independent directors on the Board of Directors 
Positive 
BOD_SIZE Size of the Board of Directors Negative (if over 7) 
BOD_STABILITY Average tenure of directors (in months) Positive 
MB_STABILITY Average tenure of the members of the Management Board (in months) 
Positive 
RATINGS Number of major rating agencies covering the bank Positive 
SCR 





STRATEGIC Strategic nature of acquisition (1 if strategic, 0 - otherwise) Positive 
TIME Quarter in which the transaction has been completed Positive 
 
We have also considered several other candidate variables, but decided not to include them in 
the model either on theoretical grounds or for practical reasons. Western concepts of corporate 
governance may attach weight to factors that in the Russian circumstances play a different role. For 
instance, S & P focuses on the ownership structure and external influences as one of four main areas 
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driving the cumulative rating of corporate governance. Most Russian banks display a very high 
degree of ownership concentration with a blockholder present in each bank, so this indicator 
becomes a dummy variable with value next to constant. Another example is a dummy variable 
reflecting whether the CEO and the Chairman of the Board of Directors is the same person 
(situation quite common in the American banks). The Russian legislation prohibits such practice, so 
all companies in the sample share this feature, therefore inclusion of this variable would not add 
value. Some of the indicators of corporate governance quality suitable for mature markets (e.g. 
frequency of Board meetings, the number of Board committees, and proportion of outside 
Directors) become mutilated by the basic Russian cultural institution of tolerating a huge gap 
between form and substance. Most of the recorded Board meetings may have never taken place; 
Board committees can exist on paper only; and many Directors positioned as non-affiliated to the 
executive management of the company are actually insiders or beneficial owners. Foreign nationals’ 
presence in a Board of Directors as a proxy for good corporate governance [Choi, Hasan, 2005] 
does not convince us: it is most likely to be a pure window-dressing and an attempt to manipulate 
the investors, which in our opinion constitutes bad governance practice. 
 
5. The model and estimation results 
 
In order to quantify the impact of selected indicators on the valuation of banks, we tried to 
build a multiple linear regression model explaining the dependent variable – P/BV ratio.  
Our first step was to determine the preliminary list of statistically significant regressors. We 
approached this task by defining a simple least-squares regression model: 
 
(1) P/BV = 0 + 1*VARIABLEi 
 
whereVARIABLEi is one of the dependent variables defined in the preceding section. We 
have run a series of ordinary least-squares regressions to see which regressors are statistically 
significant. We had to employ this procedure rather than running a multiple regressiondue to a 
limited number of data points and a wide array of explanatory variables. Having established the set 
of significant regressors, we built a multiple regression model using P/BV as the dependent variable 
and the significant regressors discovered in the previous stage as the independent variables. The 
results of the estimation appear in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Significance of individual regressors 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
P-value 
ASSETS -0.3461 0.2191 0.1527 
AUDITORS 0.2000 0.3432 0.5761 
BOD_IND -0.6422 0.6491 0.3515 
BOD_SIZE -0.0036 0.0610 0.9539 
BOD_STABILITY 0.0075 0.0067 0.2952 
MB_STABILITY 0.0071 0.0054 0.2216 
RATINGS -0.2667 0.2436 0.3055 
SCR 0.9858 0.7032 0.1985 
STRATEGIC 0.1583 0.3532 0.6659 
TIME 0.0024 0.0642 0.9709 
 
Comparing these results to a priori expectations regarding the impact of our candidate 
regressors on the dependent variable, it is noteworthy that most variables turned out to have the 
signs we expected them to, with three major exceptions: RATINGS (the number of rating agencies 
covering the bank), ASSETS (natural logarithm of asset size) and BOD_IND (Board of Directors’ 
degree of independence from the management) turned out to have a negative sign.  
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A casual observation of p-values in Table 2 reveals two obvious outliers: TIME and 
BOD_SIZE are apparently insignificant and should be dropped from the model. This results in a 
revised list of regressors which we then use to build the following multiple least-squares model: 
 
(2) P/BV = 0 + 1*ASSETS + 2*AUDITORS + 3*BOD_IND + 4*SCR + 
5*MB_STABILITY+ 6*BOD_STABILITY + 7*STRATEGIC + 8*RATINGS 
 
Having run a least-squares estimation procedure we obtained the following output: 
 
Table 3: Preliminary model - regression statistics 
R-squared 0.9936 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9428 
Standard Error 0.1250 
Observations 10 
 
Table 4: Preliminary model - analysis of variance 
 Degrees of 
freedom Sum of squares 
Mean sum of 
squares F-value F-significance
Regression 8 2.4404 0.3050 19.5288 0.1733 
Residual 1 0.0156 0.0156   
Total 9 2.4560    
 
Table 5: Preliminary model - regression coefficients 
 Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic P-Value 
Intercept -4.3538 2.8671 -1.5186 0.3707 
ASSETS 0.5606 0.3280 1.7089 0.3370 
AUDITORS 0.4828 0.1675 2.8824 0.2126 
BOD_IND -0.4808 0.2897 -1.6596 0.3452 
SCR 2.5896 0.7221 3.5862 0.1731 
MB_STABILITY 0.0150 0.0040 3.7352 0.1665 
BOD_STABILITY 0.0095 0.0045 2.1244 0.2801 
STRATEGIC 0.9429 0.1861 5.0659 0.1241 
RATINGS 0.0287 0.2580 0.1113 0.9294 
 
Considering the output we received from the model, we can further improve our model by 
eliminating the least significant variables, namely RATINGS and BOD_IND. Thus, the new model 
can be formulated as: 
 
(3) P/BV = 0 + 1*ASSETS + 2*AUDITORS + 3*SCR + 4*MB_STABILITY+ 
5*BOD_STABILITY + 6*STRATEGIC 
 
Running the estimation procedure again we get the following results (Tables 6, 7 and 8). 
 
Table 6: Final model - regression statistics 
R-squared 0.9666 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8999 
Standard Error 0.1653 
Observations 10 
 
Table 7: Final model - analysis of variance 
 Degrees of Sum of Mean sum of F-value F-significance
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freedom squares squares 
Regression 6 2.3741 0.3957 14.4877 0.0256 
Residual 3 0.0819 0.0273   
Total 9 2.4560    
 
Table 8:Final model - regression coefficients 
 Coefficient Standard error T-Statistic P-Value 
Intercept -5.7951 2.1676 -2.6736 0.0755 
ASSETS 0.6600 0.2037 3.2401 0.0478 
AUDITORS 0.4035 0.1511 2.6705 0.0757 
SCR 3.1787 0.6844 4.6445 0.0188 
MB_STABILITY 0.0140 0.0047 2.9838 0.0584 
BOD_STABILITY 0.0118 0.0054 2.1702 0.1184 
STRATEGIC 0.8794 0.1695 5.1868 0.0139 
 
6. Interpretation of results 
 
The model appears to have an excellent fit, i.e. it explains nearly all variations in the 
dependent variable (P/BV). The model thus successfully passes the F-test6, and all its regressors 
(including the intercept) are statistically significant (with a possible exception of 
BOD_STABILITY, which we have nevertheless decided to keep in the model for the sake of 
consistency). 
Holding all else equal, a 1% increase in the value of total assets leads to an increase of 0.66 of 
the P/BV multiple at acquisition. The presence of recognized auditors further tends to increase the 
valuation multiple by 0.40. The increase in stability of Management Board and the Board of 
Directors (measured in extra months of average tenure of members) by one month further boosts 
valuation by 0.01, which admittedly is a rather negligible (but still statistically significant) 
contribution. The strategic nature of acquisition (STRATEGIC) increases the premium paid by the 
acquirer to book the value of equity by further 0.88. Finally, by far the most visible contribution is 
made by the shareholder concentration ratio (SCR). A very closely held company with 3 
shareholders controlling all 100% of shares would instantly yield a 3.18 P/BV multiple. 
Our results might be interpreted in the following wayfrom the viewpoint of economics and the 
management theory. 
Acquirers are likely to attach positive value to the fact that the target bank is closely held, i.e. 
to the degree of control exercised by the top 3 shareholders (SCR). The higher the ownership 
concentration, the lower the bargaining power of the minority shareholders, and less cost for the 
controlling owner to re-align his new subsidiary.  
The variable ASSETShas changed its sign from negative, in the preliminary version of our 
model, to positive in the final version. The premium for a greater amount of assets could mean that 
investors are anxious to acquire a larger market share and are willing to pay extra for a larger asset 
base. We believe that the change of sign is most directly explained as a result of an ‘omitted 
variable bias’ – our initial estimation used simple least squares estimation, obviously omitting 
several significant variables.  
The premium paid by the investors for high quality audit (AUDITORS) could indicate that the 
acquirers mistrust the local accounting firms and wish to pay up for the comfort provided by an 
established auditor.  
The stability of the boards of the target bank (MB_STABILITY and BOD_STABILITY) 
increases its valuation. This outcome of our modeling does not come as a surprise. Interestingly, the 
empirical evidence suggests that within the first year after the ownership change a shake-over of the 
                                                 
6 F-test is a statistical test of null hypothesis that all regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. Failure to 
accept the null hypothesis means that at least one of our regressors is linearly related to the dependent variable. 
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management team takes place (examples: International Moscow Bank and Impexbank). In most 
cases it happens at the initiative of the managers themselves who do not accept an inevitable 
reduction of their status within a larger institution, or do not wish to adjust to a totally different 
corporate culture, or find the new compensation packages unattractive while opportunities for 
opportunistic action shrinks. As regards the Board of Directors, the general practice in Russia is the 
complete replacement of the board with representatives of the new owner (hence the low 
significance of Board stability as an explanatory variable). By paying a premium for 
MB_STABILITY and BOD_STABILITY, are investors wasting their money on an asset they will 
not be able to take full advantage of? This matter requires further analysis.  
As regards the strategic nature of the acquisition (STRATEGIC), it appears that in such 
transactions the acquirer is much keener to acquire the target than in speculative transactions. This 
could stem from the desire to gain quick access to the Russian banking market and thus be less 
concerned with the economics of acquisition. Our previous research in this area [Bokov, Vernikov, 
2008] showed a total lack of significance of profitability ratios, which further reinforces this 
argument. 
The fact that RATINGS (the number of rating agencies covering the bank) as a proxy for 
bank transparency did not show much impact, contrary to our expectations, might be caused by 
various reasons. Ratings are,per se, a proxy for credit risk and generally substitute rigorous credit 
analysis. But any acquisition transaction inevitably includes a very thorough due diligence 
procedure that may reveal more information than a credit opinion from a ratings agency. Another 
explanation is that international credit ratings remain a rarity among the Russian banks beyond the 
first tier, while it has been precisely second- and third-tier banks,with the exception of Rosbank, to 
fall prey to strategic foreign investors. Buyers just may not expect target banks to have external 
credit ratings. Another yet explanation is that investors’ confidence in external credit ratings has 
been eroded by recent scandals when the rating agencies failed to do their job diligently. 
Our study did not find statistically significant correlation between Board of Directors’ 
independence (BOD_IND), on the one hand, and bank valuation, on the other. This outcome serves 
as a reality check for the promoters of corporate governancein Russia. An independent Board of 
Directors apparently creates insufficient value in the perception of the acquirer. We are still fighting 
with a credible explanation for it. Perhaps the lack of significance of indicators featuring the 
qualities of the Board of Directors means that the acquirer intends to reappoint the Board regardless 
of its qualities. In our sample most transactions represent acquisitions, and it introduces a bias into 
the regression. Had the sample consisted of a more balanced mix of acquisitions and share 
offerings, the outcome could have been different because we expect minority investors to appreciate 
more the status quo of governance in the bank since they have little chance of completely 
overhauling it. (The same bias may have acted against the significance of indicator RATINGS). 
Anyhow, the rationale for setting up strong corporate boards with a high degree of independence 
now looks shakier if there are other options besides an IPO – such expense may not be adequately 




We attempted to quantify the impact of quality of governance on valuation of the banking 
firms in Russia. In order to formalize the measurement of the quality of governance and 
management we suggest an original set of variables. A least squares multiple linear regression 
model includes statistically significant factors and is applied to explain differences in valuation of 
10 banks in our sample. Methodological imperfections notwithstanding our attempt yielded some 
interesting findings.  
First, investors clearly prefer closely held banks, probably with the view of avoiding 
additional hassle of dealing with minority stakeholders and the absence of reliable institutions of 
corporate law and corporate governance in Russia. 
Second, size matters. The larger the assets size, the greater the P/BV multiple, ceteris paribus. 
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Third, investors appreciate the stability of the management team in charge of the target bank 
and are prepared to pay extra for it. Having in place a strong coherent management team creates 
value, although in practice the chances of such a team remaining in place after an ownership change 
are slim. 
Fourth, efforts and expenses incurred in the process of upgrading corporate governance to 
‘best international standards’ do not necessarily pay off. Investors seem to broadly disregard the 
independence, stability, maturity and size of the Board of Directors, maybe because the intention is 
to reappoint the Board in any case. 
Fifth, with regard to transparency, investors do not sufficiently reward a bank’s exposure to 
the scrutiny of rating agencies, while at the same time the quality of external auditors adds value to 
the bank. 
As a direction for future research, we plan to broaden the coverage and increase the sample 
size. M&A activity in the Russian banking sector has picked up in 2007-2008 in the context of the 
consolidation triggered by the global financial crisis, so we anticipate more deals throughout the 
rest of 2008 and 2009. We must learn to control price differences between transactions implying 
shift of control (acquisitions) and those not affecting control (IPOs, SPOs and stock trading). Data 
on the stock market valuation of the publicly-traded Russian banks will be added at a later stage. 
We may also try going beyond price-to-book-value multiples to employ alternative methods of 
valuation of the banking business, e.g. by considering yields on senior bonds or hybrid capital 
products issued by the Russian banks [Bokov, 2007]. We willstudy the impact of a stable set of 
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Appendix 1: Sample of transactions* 
Date Target Acquirer Type P/BV 
21.04.2005 KMB-Bank Intesa Sale 3.90 
12.08.2005 DeltaCredit Société Générale Sale 3.20 
26.10.2005 Monchebank DnB NOR Sale 2.20 
31.01.2006 Impexbank Raiffeisen Sale 2.90 
01.08.2006 Vozrozhdenie -- IPO 4.00 
14.09.2006 National Standard OEMK-Invest Sale 1.15 
10.10.2006 International Moscow Bank UniCredit Sale 2.90 
01.11.2006 Investsberbank OTP Sale 3.90 
08.11.2006 Orgresbank Nordea Sale 4.30 
27.11.2006 Probusinessbank Merril Lynch Sale 3.00 
27.11.2006 Probusinessbank 
RennaissanceCapi
tal Sale 3.00 
04.12.2006 Promsvyazbank Commerzbank Sale 3.40 
28.12.2006 Gorodskoy Ipotechny Bank Morgan Stanley Sale 5.00 
01.03.2007 Sberbank -- SPO 3.70 
11.05.2007 VTB -- IPO 2.40 
18.05.2007 Vozrozhdenie -- SPO 3.80 
25.07.2007 Extrobank Banco Santander Sale 4.40 
10.09.2007 Absolut Bank KBC Sale 3.80 
06.11.2007 Bank SPB -- IPO 2.90 
14.02.2008 Rosbank Société Générale Sale 4.00 
03.03.2008 Expobank Barclays Sale 4.00 
26.06.2008 Investtorgbank hedge funds Sale 4.20 
27.06.2008 Uniastrum Bank Bank of Cyprus Sale 3.10 
* transactions included in the modeling and calculations are shown in italics 
Sources: public disclosure; media; our database  
 
 
